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HORIZONTAL EFFECT AND THE CHARTER
Saša Sever*
Summary: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(hereinafter: ‘Charter’)1 is an act of primary law of the EU. Whilst its 
Article 51(1) provides that individuals may invoke fundamental rights 
vis-à-vis the EU or its Member States, it is silent on the issue of wheth-
er fundamental rights can be invoked vis-à-vis other individuals.2 This 
discrepancy can be partly clarified by looking into the case law of the 
Court of Justice. So far, the Court of Justice has recognised such a 
possibility with regard to the general principle of equality as it is ex-
pressed in different forms in the chapter on ‘Equality’ of the Charter 
and in the directives which implement it. The question this contribu-
tion aims to resolve is whether the case law of the Court of Justice 
opens up such a possibility for other provisions of the Charter as well. 
The Court of Justice has, however, rejected such a possibility as far 
as socio-economic fundamental rights from the chapter on ‘Solidarity’ 
of the Charter are concerned, despite the fact that these provisions 
are made concrete by directives and the national legislation which 
implements them. I will argue that this position of the Court of Justice 
is not consistent with its existing case law on the horizontal effect of 
the Charter and undermines its full effectiveness.
1. Introduction
It is now hardly a disputed matter that the primary law of the EU 
may produce horizontal effect, that is to say it may enable individuals to 
invoke certain of its provisions vis-à-vis other individuals. Less explored 
is the fact that certain provisions of the Charter – within the scope of EU 
law and which are an expression of the general principle of equality – also 
produce effects vis-à-vis other individuals. The Court of Justice has ex-
clusive powers to determine which provision has such effect and which 
lacks it. If a particular provision of the Charter has been implemented 
by a directive and if it has been intended to facilitate the application of a 
specific general principle of law, then it has horizontal effect. Otherwise 
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1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/02.
2 Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and 
Others [2014] ECR I-0000, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para 31.
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it lacks it. The Court of Justice has developed its case law on the hori-
zontal effect of the Charter by interpreting the directives particularly in 
the area of employment law or by adjudicating on their validity with the 
Charter. Despite the wording of Article 51(1) of the Charter which governs 
the Charter’s scope of application, and according to which individuals 
may invoke fundamental rights vis-à-vis the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union and the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law, the Court of Justice has interpreted it broadly 
and has held in a number of cases that certain provisions of the Charter 
directly apply in relationships between individuals. Further, in the fu-
ture, one may expect an increase of cases where the Court of Justice is 
confronted with situations which raise the question of the right to rely, in 
proceedings between private persons, on directives which contribute to 
ensuring observance of fundamental rights, since among the fundamen-
tal rights contained in the Charter are a number which are already part 
of the existing body of EU law in the form of directives.3 
Whilst the Court of Justice’s case law on the horizontal effect of 
the Charter mainly results from preliminary references concerning the 
directives on employment law, the aim of this article is not to focus on 
that particular area of law but to examine the horizontal effect resulting 
from the Charter which forms a part of the primary law of the EU. I will 
address, in the first place, the most basic questions about the definition 
of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in EU law and the justifica-
tions for it. Next, I will discuss the relevant case law where the Court of 
Justice has recognised horizontal effect by applying a general principle 
of equality, a Treaty or a Charter provision. This case law concerns dif-
ferent forms of prohibition of discrimination which are enshrined in the 
chapter ‘Equality’4 of the Charter. I will also analyse the case law where 
the Court of Justice has not recognised the horizontal effect of the Char-
ter. Presently, these are the right to annual leave and workers’ right to 
consultation and participation in an undertaking, which can be found in 
the chapter ‘Solidarity’5 of the Charter. Although these rights constitute 
3 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Les droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne: une typolo-
gie de l’acquis’ in Emmanuelle Brebosia and Ludovic Hennebel (eds), Classer les droits de 
l’homme (Bruylant 2004) 315. The author cites, among other things, workers’ protection in 
the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), the right to fair and just working conditions 
(Article 31), the prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 
32), the right to reconcile family and professional life (Article 33), and the right of migrant 
workers to social security (Article 34(2)).
4 This chapter contains provisions concerning equality before the law (Article 20), non-
discrimination (Article 21), cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (Article 22), equality 
between men and women (Article 23), the rights of the child (Article 24), the rights of the 
elderly (Article 25) and the integration of persons with disabilities (Article 26).
5 This chapter contains provisions concerning workers’ right to information and consulta-
tion within the undertaking (Article 27), the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 
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important principles of European social law, the Court of Justice has not 
recognised them as general principles of law. Finally, I will argue that 
the exclusion of the horizontal effect of these provisions undermines the 
full effectiveness of EU law since, firstly, the right to seek compensation 
by way of damages from a Member State does not act as a sufficient de-
terrent on the latter and, secondly, waiting for the national legislator to 
adopt new legislation which is in conformity with EU law puts the party 
at the Member State’s mercy at least as far as the length of the political 
process of the adoption of acts implementing the directive is concerned. I 
will solely examine the concept of horizontal effect in an EU environment 
and will not study cases before the national courts in the Member States 
or with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights in relation 
to the enforcement of fundamental rights by private parties against other 
private parties. Likewise, I will not discuss horizontal effect in the sphere 
of EU consumer protection law.
2. The notion of horizontal effect of fundamental rights
On a more general level, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
pursues social goals in the sense that it guarantees fairness in the re-
lationships between individuals. In particular, its role is to neutralise 
asymmetries in contractual relations between individuals. One of the ex-
amples is the employment relationship where the weaker party is not 
able to protect itself sufficiently from the other party which is in a strong-
er economic and social position. In such circumstances, the intervention 
of supranational law is required in order to protect one individual from 
another. Therefore, horizontal effect is intended to provide a minimum of 
social justice in the private relations of individuals in order to guarantee 
basic fairness to the ‘weaker’ party.6
There is no unequivocal definition of horizontal effect. According to 
Ganten,7 norms given horizontal effect bind the citizens of the Member 
States in their mutual relations, ie inter se. Hartcamp8 argues that a 
Treaty provision produces horizontal effect when it may be directly ap-
28), the right of access to placement services (Article 29), protection in the event of unjusti-
fied dismissal (Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), prohibition of child 
labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), family and professional life (Ar-
ticle 33), social security and social assistance (Article 34), health care (Article 35), access to 
services of general economic interest (Article 36), environmental protection (Article 37) and 
consumer protection (Article 38).
6 Achim Seifert, ‘L’effet horizontal des droits fondamentaux’ (2012) 48(4) Revue Trimes-
trielle de Droit Européen 801.
7 Ted Oliver Ganten, Die Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten (Duncker & Humblot 2000) 23.
8 Arthur Hartkamp, ‘The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private Law: On Direct and Indirect 
Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law’ (2010) 3 European Review of Private Law 
529.
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plied to legal relationships between individuals, in the sense that subjec-
tive rights and obligations are created, modified, or extinguished between 
individuals. Prechal9 assesses that horizontal direct effect concerns a sit-
uation where a private party invokes EU law against the rules or meas-
ures of a private party that are arguably in breach of Community law, 
with the qualification that these rules or measures do not regulate the 
exercise and access of free movement in a collective manner. De Mol con-
siders that horizontal effect means that a fundamental right can apply 
as an autonomous ground for review before a national court in a dispute 
between private parties.10 
In this contribution, I will use the concept of horizontal effect in the 
broad sense as a right of a private party to rely vis-à-vis another private 
party directly on a provision of the primary law of the EU.11
Whilst there is no univocal definition of the horizontal effect of EU 
fundamental rights, it is certain that it limits the private autonomy of indi-
viduals because they have to respect fundamental rights in their contrac-
tual relationships. In fact, legal orders of the Member States are grounded 
on the liberal values of the private autonomy of the parties to conclude 
contracts in the sense that public law should not interfere with their deci-
sions. This right of choice includes a decision on whether private parties 
will conclude a contract, with whom they will conclude it, and, finally, 
what the content of their contractual relationship will be. However, the 
freedom of private parties to conclude contracts between themselves is 
not absolute and may be limited, for example, by the general principle of 
equality (Charter). In this context, two situations are likely to occur. One 
would be that a contractual clause is subjected to a review for its consist-
ency with a general principle of equality (Charter) and, if it is considered 
incompatible with the latter, it would be declared null and void. In such a 
situation, an EU norm applies directly between private individuals (substi-
tution effect). The second situation would be where the contract is based 
on a national norm. If the former, after a review in the light of the general 
principle of equality (Charter), is declared incompatible with the latter, 
then the provision of EU primary law excludes the application of the in-
consistent national norm between individuals (exclusion effect).12
9 Sacha Prechal, ‘Direct Effect Reconsidered, Redefined and Rejected’ in Jolande M Prins-
sen and Annette Schrauwen (eds), Direct Effect-Rethinking: A Classic of EC Legal Doctrine 
(Europa Law Publishing 2002) 26.
10 Mirjam De Mol, ‘Dominguez: A Deafening Silence’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law 
Review 281.
11 Trevor Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (4th edn, OUP 1998) 187; 
Eric Engle, ‘Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung)’ (2009) 5(2) Hanse Law 
Review 165.
12 Michael Dougan, ‘When Worlds Collide! Competing Visions of the Relationship Between 
Direct Effect and Supremacy (2007) 44(4) Common Market Law Review 931; Mirjam de Mol, 
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The horizontal effect of fundamental rights has been developed by 
the Court of Justice, but the reasons for its introduction are known only 
in part. It follows from its decisions that it has been grounded on the 
effectiveness of EU law and on the pursuit of social justice. Whilst in De-
frenne II,13 Mangold14 and Kücükdeveci15 the Court of Justice emphasised 
the effectiveness of the primary law of the EU, in Angonese it grounded 
it on the promotion of the free movement of workers.16 Independently of 
the grounds for its decisions, it is not clear what the Court of Justice 
means by the ‘effectiveness of EU law’. On this point, the horizontal effect 
lacks its justification. Does the Court of Justice mean that other means 
of redress for EU law violations, such as an action for the compensa-
tion of damages, an action of the Commission against a Member State, 
or the duty of consistent interpretation of EU law are not effective tools 
and thus an alternative intervention of EU law is needed? Does the Court 
of Justice, by effectiveness of EU law, mean that its intervention in the 
private sector is as important as that in the state sector? Would a lack of 
horizontal effect mean that the number of breaches of the general prin-
ciple of equality will be substantially higher in the private sector? These 
questions are unanswered by the Court of Justice, so it remains unclear 
why the effectiveness or promotion of a certain freedom is a rationale for 
horizontal effect.
One can argue that the horizontal effect of the Charter provisions 
as expressions of a general principle of law and which have been made 
concrete with directives is compensation for the lack of horizontal effect 
of directives. In this sense, Advocate General Bot opines in Kücükde-
veci17 that when it is apparent that the national legislation in question 
‘The Novel Approach of the CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-
discrimination: (Unbridled) Expansionism of EU Law? (2011) 18(1-2) Maastricht Journal 
109, 110-111.
13 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
[1976] ECR 455, para 33: ‘The effectiveness of this provision cannot be affected by the fact 
that the duty imposed by the Treaty has not been discharged by certain Member States and 
that the joint institutions have not reacted sufficiently energetically against this failure to act’.
14 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981.
15 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365, para 53: 
‘The need to ensure the full effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78, means that the national court, faced with 
a national provision falling within the scope of European Union law which it considers to be 
incompatible with that principle, and which cannot be interpreted in conformity with that 
principle, must decline to apply that provision, without being either compelled to make or 
prevented from making a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling before doing so’.
16 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR 
I-4136, para 32: ‘The Court has held that the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to freedom of movement for persons would be compromised if the abolition of 
State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal 
autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law’.
17 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG 2009 [2009] ECR I-365, 
Opinion of AG Bot, paras 57 to 70.
44 Saša Sever: Horizontal Effect and the Charter
implementing a directive is contrary to EU law, it is not contested that 
the national court, within the limits of its jurisdiction, has to ensure the 
full effectiveness of EU law when it determines the dispute before it.18 
However, national courts may sometimes be confronted with limitations 
arising from EU law itself. Thus, where proceedings between individuals 
are concerned, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an indi-
vidual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual.19 
Due to this inevitable constraint of the directives, the Court of Justice 
developed the concept of indirect effect of directives. According to this 
concept, in applying national law, the national court called on to inter-
pret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording 
and the purpose of the directive in question, in order to achieve the result 
pursued by the directive.20 
However, this concept also has its limits. A national court cannot 
always interpret the national law ‘as far as possible’ in the light of the 
directive.21 In such situations, the effectiveness of EU law would be put at 
risk. If it is true that an injured party may bring an action in tort against 
a recalcitrant Member State,22 those national authorities and national 
courts that show least respect for EU law in general are unlikely to show 
any greater respect for this action, the application of which remains in 
the hands of national courts.23 Similarly, the Commission is able to han-
dle just a small number of breaches.24 Furthermore, it may take a while 
for a national legislator to harmonise its legislation with EU law. It results 
from these considerations that due to the constraints stemming from the 
lack of application of directives between individuals, the horizontal effect 
of the fundamental rights of the EU is necessary in order to assure the 
full effectiveness of EU law and the effective protection of fundamental 
18 Kücükdeveci (n 15) para 48.
19 Case 152/84 MH Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Au-
thority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 723, para 48; Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb 
Srl [1994] ECR I-3325, para 20; and Joined Cases Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-397/01), Wilhelm 
Roith (C-398/01), Albert Süß (C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-
401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes 
Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV [2004] ECR I-8835, para 108.
20 Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] 
ECR 1891, para 26; Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimen-
tacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8; Faccini Dori (n 19) para 26; and Pfeiffer and Others (n 
19) para 113.
21 Kücükdeveci (n 15) para 49; Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique 
du Centre Ouest Atlantique, Préfet de la région Centre [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 25-26; and 
Case C-176/10 Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Oth-
ers [2014] ECR I-0000, paras 39-40.
22 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and Others v 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
23 See Hartley (n 11) 232.
24 ibid 202.
45CYELP 10 [2014] 39-65
rights. In addition, ‘a duty of the national court to disapply conflicting 
national law which is in conflict with a general principle of law’ may 
be considered as a sanction imposed on a Member State for not having 
implemented a directive within the specified time period.25 However, a 
disapplication of national law and an application instead of a norm of EU 
law having horizontal effect is limited in time to the moment a national 
legislator harmonises it with EU law.26
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the existence of 
horizontal effect is surrounded by uncertainties as to its grounds of ex-
istence, its definition and its scope. However, it can at least be firmly 
argued, in particular from Defrenne II and Angonese and from the case 
law referring to these cases, that the Court of Justice has recognised it as 
far as fundamental rights are concerned based on the objective of social 
justice.
3. Application of fundamental rights ‘within the scope of EU law’
The scope of the application of the Charter is a question connected 
with its horizontal effect. With regard to this question, Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union provides that the provisions of the Charter 
shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined 
in the Treaties. Likewise, the Charter, pursuant to Article 51(2) thereof, 
does not extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of 
the EU or establish any new power or task for the EU, or modify the pow-
ers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.
According to the existing case law of the Court of Justice, a situa-
tion must fall within the scope of EU law for a general principle of law or 
a Charter to apply.27 The least contested situation is if the situation falls 
within the scope of a directive which gives effect to the Charter principle 
which is an expression of a general principle of law. Then, the Court of 
Justice will not hesitate to recognise the horizontal effect of a fundamen-
tal right and will decide the case on the merits. However, the Charter 
cannot apply to a situation falling outside the scope of EU law, since 
the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights are 
binding on Member States ‘whenever they implement EU law’.28 In such 
a situation, the Court of Justice will reject the applicability of EU law. 
25 Sacha Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General Principles of Law’ (2010) 3(1) Review of 
European Administrative Law 5, 19.
26 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union after Lisbon’ (2010) EUI Working Papers, Academy of European Law, 
2010/6, 14.
27 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECR I-0000, para 21.
28 Case C-27/11 Anton Vinkov v Nachalnik Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost [2012] 
ECR I-0000, para 56.
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Some contested situations exist where there is no Member State’s imple-
menting legislation, but the subject matter nevertheless falls within the 
scope of EU law and thus the principle of equality from the Charter is 
applicable.29 Therefore, the term ‘whenever they implement EU law’ must 
be understood broadly and also covers situations which fall within the 
scope of EU law despite the fact that there is no implementing national 
legislation. This field of application of the fundamental rights of the Euro-
pean Union is borne out by the explanations relating to Article 51 of the 
Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) 
TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration 
for the purpose of interpreting it. According to those explanations, ‘the 
requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the 
Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope 
of Union law’.
An illustrative example of the application of fundamental rights 
within the scope of EU law is the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 
in Bartsch30 where she argued that the situation giving rise to the refer-
ence does not fall within the scope of EU law. The case concerns the oc-
cupational pension scheme of Bosch-Siemens Hausgeräte GmbH (‘BSH’). 
Paragraph 6(4) of the scheme’s guidelines provided for a pension to be 
paid to the widow(er) of an employee who has died during his or her 
employment relationship, if certain conditions have been met. However, 
payments will not be made if ‘the widow/widower is more than 15 years 
younger than the former employee’. The widow, Mrs Bartsch, was born in 
1965, whereas Mr Bartsch was born in 1944 and died in 2004 whilst em-
ployed by BSH. Therefore, one of the conditions for the widow’s pension 
was not met. The respective Advocate General considered that there was 
no pertinent specific substantive rule of Community law governing the 
situation in question. In those circumstances, she considered that the 
general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective 
of age as identified by the Court of Justice in Mangold, cannot be applied 
horizontally. In so saying, she added that she accepted that such a gen-
eral principle can apply (both vertically and horizontally) to the extent 
that it does so within a specific EU law framework.31 The Court of Justice 
followed her opinion.32 
29 Case C-43/95 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Ronny Forsberg v MSL Dynamics Ltd [1996] 
ECR I-4661.
30 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge 
GmbH [2008] ECR I-07245, Opinion of AG Sharpston.
31 ibid, paras 86-87.
32 Case C-427/06 Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge 
GmbH [2008] ECR. I-07245.
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4. Specific applications of the general principle of equal treatment 
between private parties
Traditionally, the principle of equality binds the Union institutions 
and also the Member States, where they implement, or act within the 
scope of, EU law. In certain circumstances, it may bind natural and legal 
persons. This occurs in particular in the areas of prohibition of discrimi-
nation on grounds of nationality and sex discrimination.33
4.1 General principle of equal pay for equal work (Article 23(2) of 
the Charter)
Indeed, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights of the EU con-
cerning the application of the general principle of equality – the principle 
of equal pay and prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
– existed in the primary law of the EU and was, therefore, legally bind-
ing before the adoption of the Charter. So, the horizontal effect of these 
provisions was, when the Charter was adopted, a well-established rule 
rather than an exception. Moreover, since corresponding provisions also 
exist in the Charter, the horizontal effect is also recognised for the latter 
provisions. In any case, it would be paradoxical if the introduction of the 
Charter reduced the protection of fundamental rights in primary law.34 
The ‘core’ case where the Court of Justice ruled that a Treaty provi-
sion concerning a fundamental right has horizontal effect is Defrenne II. 
It concerned the interpretation of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty35 (Article 
157 TFEU and Article 23(2) of the Charter). In 1970, Gabrielle Defrenne, 
an air hostess who worked for the Belgian airline Sabena, brought a legal 
action against the airline in a Belgian court because it had paid her less 
than male cabin crew doing the same work. She claimed back-payment 
of the difference. The Belgian court made a preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice and the central question was whether Article 119 of the 
EC Treaty has direct effect. The wording of this article clearly indicates 
that it is addressed to the Member States and that they should bring it 
into force. However, the Court of Justice ruled that Article 119 of the EEC 
Treaty conferred rights directly on individuals in Member States and that 
it has horizontal effect. In paragraph 39 which, due to its importance, is 
reproduced below, the Court of Justice stated:
33 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 74-75.
34 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 2) paras 34, 35.
35 It provided: ‘Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently 
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for 
equal work’. Whilst Member States had not implemented Article 119 by 31 December 1961 
when the first stage for bringing the Treaty into operation ended, they fixed 31 December 
1964 as the new date. Since several Member States did not meet this deadline, the Council 
issued a directive on equal pay which had to be implemented within one year.
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In fact, since Article 119 is mandatory in nature, the prohibition on 
discrimination between men and women applies not only to the action of 
public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended 
to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between indi-
viduals.
After the Court of Justice observed that this provision was formally 
addressed to the Member States and that it was sufficiently precise to 
produce direct effect, it went on and ‘identified and isolated’ the general 
principle of equal pay for equal work.36 By assessing that this provision 
was ‘mandatory in nature’, the Court of Justice meant that it was not 
subject to private autonomy.37 
This reasoning of the Court of Justice reminds us partly of the one 
adopted in Van Gend en Loos.38 In fact, Article 12 of the EEC Treaty was 
formally addressed to the Member States: it imposed an obligation on 
them but did not expressly grant any corresponding right to individu-
als to import goods free of any duty imposed after the establishment of 
the EC. Nor did it state that any such duty would be invalid. One would 
therefore think that it was not directly effective. However, the Court of 
Justice took the view that this provision is not prevented from being di-
rectly effective merely because it is formally addressed to the Member 
States and does not expressly confer rights on private individuals.39 The 
Court of Justice ruled that ‘the very nature of this prohibition’ makes it 
ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between 
Member States and its subjects.40 
4.2 General principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality (Article 21(2) of the Charter)
As far as the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
is considered, the Court of Justice held in Angonese that a job applicant 
could sue a private bank before a national court by invoking the prin-
ciple of free movement of workers – a specific expression of the general 
36 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment and the Court of Justice’, 21 May 2013, 
lecture given at the Faculty of Laws of the University of Sofia in Bulgaria, 11 <http://in-
tranet/vicepresid/docs/2013_The%20principle%20of%20equal%20treatment%20and%20
the%20ECJ_21%20May%202013_Bulgarie%20Université%20de%20Sofia_version%20
pour%20distribution.pdf> accessed 29 September 2014. This contribution is accessible on 
the intranet site of the Court of Justice. 
37 Koen Lenaerts and Jose Antonio Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Pow-
ers and General Principles of EU Law’ (2010) 47(6) CML Rev 1648, footnote 104.
38 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos (Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming) NV v 
Kingdom of Netherlands (inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen) [1963] ECR 1.
39 See Hartley (n 11) 191.
40 See Van Gend en Loos (n 38) para 13.
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principle of equality – from Article 39 of the EC Treaty41 (Article 45 of the 
TFEU and Article 21(2) of the Charter), recognising thus that this provi-
sion of the Treaty has horizontal effect. The Court of Justice reasoned 
that the findings in Defrenne II could by analogy apply, since the general 
principle of equal pay for equal work and the general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality as expressed by the free move-
ment of workers are ‘mandatory in nature’ and therefore the prohibition 
of discrimination applied equally to all agreements intended to regulate 
paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals. In 
addition, the Court of Justice considered that the fact that a certain pro-
vision of a Treaty is formally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual 
who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down.42
4.3 Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex (Article 21 (1) 
and 23 of the Charter)
Test-Achats43 is a case where the Court’s validity review of a directive 
had direct consequences for a private dispute concerning the application 
of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex from Article 21(1) 
of the Charter. The referring court asked in this case whether Article 5(2) 
of Directive 2004/11344 is valid in the light of the (general) principle of 
equal treatment for men and women. The Court of Justice considered 
that the purpose of Directive 2004/113 in the insurance services sector 
is, as reflected in Article 5(1) of that directive, the application of unisex 
rules on premiums and benefits. Recital 18 to Directive 2004/113 ex-
pressly states that, in order to guarantee equal treatment between men 
and women, the use of sex as an actuarial factor must not result in dif-
ferences in premiums and benefits for insured individuals. It recalled 
that Recital 19 to that directive describes the option granted to Member 
States not to apply the rule of unisex premiums and benefits as an option 
to permit ‘exemptions’. 
The Court of Justice opined that Directive 2004/113 is based on 
the premise that, for the purposes of applying the (general) principle of 
equal treatment for men and women, enshrined in Articles 21 and 23 of 
the Charter, the respective situations of men and women with regard to 
41 The Court of Justice recognised the direct effect of Article 39 of the EC Treaty also in 
Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 
1405.
42 See Angonese (n 16) para 34.
43 Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL, Yann van Vugt 
and Charles Basselier v Kingdom of Belgium (Conseil des ministres) [2011] ECR I-00773.
44 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between women and men in the access to and supply of goods and services 
[2004] OJ L373, 37.
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insurance premiums and benefits contracted by them are comparable. 
Accordingly, there is a risk that EU law may permit the derogation from 
the equal treatment of men and women, provided for in Article 5(2) of 
Directive 2004/113, to persist indefinitely. The Court of Justice added 
that such a provision, which enables the Member States in question to 
maintain without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of uni-
sex premiums and benefits, works against the achievement of the objec-
tive of equal treatment between men and women, which is the purpose of 
Directive 2004/113, and is incompatible with Articles 21 and 23 of the 
Charter. 
In the light of the above, the answer of the Court of Justice to the 
question referred was that Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113 is invalid 
with effect from 21 December 2012. 
On the grounds of this judgment, private parties may invoke Articles 
21(1) and 23 of the Charter directly against private insurance companies. 
In fact, the judgment concerns all insurance contracts whether conclud-
ed with a state-owned or a private insurance company. It imposes an 
obligation on all insurance companies that contracts concluded after 21 
December 2012 shall not use gender as an element for discrimination 
with regard to the calculation of insurance premiums.
4.4 General principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
(Article 21 (1) of the Charter)
The Court of Justice in Mangold and Kücükdeveci ‘discovered’ the 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. While the 
Charter is in its entirety probably not binding on private individuals, 
certain grounds mentioned in its Article 21(1) are because they are an 
expression of a certain general principle of law. In contrast, a Charter 
provision as such or which is not an expression of a general principle of 
law has no horizontal effect.45
4.4.1 Mangold
In Mangold, the referring national court asked the Court of Justice 
whether Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/7846 must be interpreted as pre-
cluding paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG,47 a provision of domestic law, which 
45 Mirjam De Mol, ‘Kücükdeveci: Mangold Revisited – Horizontal Direct Effect of a General 
Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6(2) European Constitutional Law Review 293.
46 Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303, 16.
47 The Law on Part-time Working and Fixed-term Contracts Amending and Repealing Provi-
sions of Employment Law (Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge und zur 
Änderung und Aufhebung arbeitsrechtlicher Bestimmungen) of 21 December 2000 (BGBl 
2000, 1966, ‘TzBfG’) that entered into force on 1 January 2001) as amended by the First 
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authorises, without restriction, unless there is a close connection with 
an earlier contract of employment of indefinite duration concluded with 
the same employer, the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of employment 
once the worker has reached the age of 52. Article 6(1) provides that, not-
withstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that differences of 
treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within 
the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified 
by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour mar-
ket and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary.
Advocate General Tizzano and the Court of Justice concluded that 
paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG must be considered to go beyond what is 
appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objective pursued since 
it takes into consideration age as the sole factor. 
However, in response to the question referred, Advocate General Tiz-
zano proposed that a national court, hearing a dispute involving private 
parties only, cannot disapply, at their expense, provisions of national 
law which are in conflict with a directive. In fact, in view of the duties 
that flow from the second paragraph of Article 10 of the EC Treaty and 
the third paragraph of Article 249 of the EC Treaty, the national court 
is bound to construe those provisions as far as possible in the light of 
the wording and purpose of the directive, in order to achieve the result 
sought by it, and this applies also in the cases of directives for which the 
deadline for transposition into national law has not yet expired.48
4.4.1.1 New general principle of law
The Court of Justice did not follow Advocate General Tizzano’s opin-
ion and held that it is irrelevant if the period prescribed for the transposi-
tion into domestic law of Directive 2000/78 had not yet expired. In this 
regard, the Court of Justice, by applying quite an innovative approach, 
emphasised that Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down the general 
principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, 
but only lays down a general framework for combating discrimination on 
the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. It is 
well known that a directive is an act of secondary law of the Union and 
is as such subordinated to Union acts which are of a higher hierarchical 
order. In this context, the Court of Justice stated that the source of the 
‘new’ principle underlying the prohibition of those forms of discrimina-
tion is found, as is clear from the third and fourth recitals in the pream-
Law for the Provision of Modern Services on the Labour Market of 23 December 2002 (BGBl 
2002 I, 14607).
48 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981, Opinion of AG Tiz-
zano, para 122.
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ble to Directive 2000/78, in various international instruments and in the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.49
This reasoning led the Court of Justice to the finding that the prohi-
bition of discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of law.50 
It is well known that general principles of law apply in horizontal and 
vertical relations,51 so the mentioned general principle of law perfectly 
applies in a relation between private parties such as that in the main pro-
ceedings where Mr Mangold concluded a fixed-term work contract with 
Mr Helm. In the light of these considerations, it was immaterial whether 
the implementation deadline for Directive 2000/78 had expired or not, 
because the national legislator is in any event bound by general princi-
ples of law.52 
Furthermore, the finding that the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of age is a general principle of law has far reaching consequenc-
es. In this respect, the Court of Justice made the following important 
statement. By referring to its previous case law in Simmenthal53 and 
Solred,54 it stated that: 
it is the responsibility of the national court, hearing a dispute 
involving the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, 
to provide, in a case within its jurisdiction, the legal protection 
which individuals derive from the rules of Community law and to 
ensure that those rules are fully effective, setting aside any pro-
vision of national law which may conflict with that law. 55
4.4.2 Kücükdeveci
Kücükdeveci confirmed and clarified to a certain extent Mangold. 
Advocate General Bot in his opinion56 emphasised the hierarchy of legal 
49 See Mangold (n 14) para 74.
50 ibid, para 75.
51 Dorota Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights’ in Ulf Bernitz, Xavier 
Groussot and Felix Schulyok (eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2013) 174. The author argues that the Court of Justice has tried 
to rectify the situation of imbalance between the market and social values by making gen-
eral principles of fundamental rights horizontally applicable.
52 See Prechal (n 25) 17 who argues that it is somewhat difficult to understand that where 
the Member States are explicitly given certain latitude by a directive, this can be overruled 
by virtue of a general principle of law. I would add that it is unusual that this has been done 
by virtue of a new general principle of law which was not known to the private parties when 
they concluded the contract.
53 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 
629, para 21.
54 Case C-347/96 Solred SA v Administración General del Estado [1998] ECR I-937, para 30.
55 See Mangold (n 14) para 77.
56 Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG [2010] ECR I-365, Opinion 
of AG Bot.
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norms of EU law according to which a directive that has been adopted to 
facilitate the implementation of the general principle of equal treatment 
and non-discrimination cannot reduce the scope of that principle. In fact, 
the Court of Justice has envisaged the relationship between a norm of 
primary EU law and a norm of secondary legislation. A comparison can 
usefully be made between the way in which it has approached the rela-
tionship between Article 119 of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 
119 of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty have been 
replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC)), which lays down the principle of 
equal pay for male and female workers, and Directive 75/117/EEC.57 In 
its judgment in Defrenne II, which was regrettably not referred to in Man-
gold, the Court of Justice stated that Directive 75/117 provides further 
details regarding certain aspects of the material scope of Article 119 of 
the EEC Treaty and also adopts various provisions whose essential pur-
pose is to improve the legal protection of workers who may be wronged 
by failure to apply the principle of equal pay laid down by that article. It 
considered that the directive was intended to encourage the proper im-
plementation of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty by means of a series of 
measures to be taken at the national level without, however, reducing the 
effectiveness of that article. In its judgment in Jenkins,58 the Court held, 
with the same line of reasoning, that Article 1 of that directive, which is 
principally designed to facilitate the practical application of the principle 
of equal pay outlined in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, in no way alters 
the content or scope of that principle as defined in that article. The Court 
referred to that case law in Cadman.59 Advocate General Bot concludes 
that it is perfectly logical that the Court of Justice considered in Mangold 
that the fact that the time-limit for the transposition of Directive 2000/78 
had not expired could not undermine the effectiveness of the principle 
of non-discrimination on grounds of age and, in order to ensure that ef-
fectiveness, the national court had to disapply provisions of national law 
which were contrary to Community law.60 
The Court of Justice in its case law stated that it is settled case law 
that even a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive does 
not apply in proceedings exclusively between private parties, and that 
the second sentence of paragraph 622(2) of the BGB61 was not open to an 
interpretation in conformity with Directive 2000/78.62
57 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women [1975] OJ L045, 19.
58 Case 96/80 J Jenkins v Kingsgate Ltd [1981] ECR 911.
59 Case C-17/05 BF Cadman v Health & Safety Executive [2006] ECR I-9583.
60 ibid, paras 83-85.
61 The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch).
62 See Kücükdeveci (n 15) paras 21, 46-49.
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The Court of Justice followed the opinion of the respective Advo-
cate General and confirmed, referring to Mangold and Defrenne II, that 
the general principle of non-discrimination as given expression in Direc-
tive 2000/78 and in Article 21(1) of the Charter applies in proceedings 
between private parties. In particular, the Court of Justice stated that 
Directive 2000/78 merely gives expression to, but does not lay down, the 
principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation, and that the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of 
law in that it constitutes a specific application of the general principle of 
equal treatment.63  Consequently, the Court of Justice held that:
it is for the national court, hearing a dispute involving the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expres-
sion in Directive 2000/78, to provide, within the limits of its 
jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from 
European Union law and to ensure the full effectiveness of that 
law, disapplying if need be any provision of national legislation 
contrary to that principle.64 (Hereinafter: the Mangold/Kücükde-
veci approach.)
The Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach-has very wide implications. A 
national judge has to disapply ‘any’ provision of national law which may 
conflict with a general principle of law, providing that the provision of na-
tional law falls within the scope of application of EU law and in particular 
has been adopted to implement a directive. This may include national 
law in all fields, such as constitutional, administrative, criminal, civil and 
employment law, and law adopted by any organism of the state, such as 
a national assembly, government or a local entity. It may also include 
national judicial decisions of any court, including a constitutional court.
4.4.3 Main critiques of the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach
The reasoning of the Court of Justice in Mangold and consequently 
in Kücükdeveci has been criticised in many ways. At the time of the pro-
nouncement of this judgment, neither international documents on hu-
man rights nor the majority of the constitutional traditions of Member 
States explicitly banned this ground of discrimination,65 so the Court of 
Justice lacked the necessary basis for discovering a new general princi-
ple. Moreover, a reference to Article 21 of the Charter would in this regard 
not be fruitful since back then it was not a binding document but a mere 
63 ibid, para 50.
64 ibid, para 51.
65 An explicit ban on age discrimination can only be found in the Finnish and Portuguese 
constitutions. International instruments explicitly prohibiting discrimination in respect of 
age do not exist. See Marlene Schmidt, ‘The Principle of Non-discrimination in Respect of 
Age: Dimensions of the ECJ’s Mangold Judgment’ (2006) 7(5) German Law Journal, 519. 
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declaration. Additionally, Advocate General Mazák opined in Palacios de 
la Villa66 that ‘[t]he most salient feature of the judgment in Mangold […] is 
probably the finding that “the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age must […] be regarded as a general principle of Community law”.’67 
In his opinion, the Court of Justice had used that concept to defuse the 
objection that at the material time the period allowed for the transposi-
tion of Directive 2000/78 had not yet expired for Germany, and by ap-
plying this concept, the Court of Justice was able to avoid the question 
about whether the directive has horizontal effect. However, he argued 
that neither Article 13 EC nor Directive 2000/78 necessarily reflects an 
already existing prohibition of all the forms of discrimination to which 
they refer. Rather, the underlying intention was in both cases to leave it 
to the Community legislature and the Member States to take appropriate 
action to that effect.68 He supported his allegation with Grant,69 in which 
the Court of Justice concluded that Community law, as it stood, did not 
cover discrimination based on sexual orientation.70 He recalled that if the 
Mangold judgment was followed, the so-called domino effect could occur 
because not only prohibition on grounds of age, but all specific prohibi-
tions of the types of discrimination referred to in Article 1 of Directive 
2000/78 would have to be regarded as general principles of law.71
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer took the view in Maruko72 
that the ‘essential character’ of the right to non-discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation which can also be found in Article 21(1) of 
the Charter is of a different order to that which the Court attributed to 
the principle of non-discrimination based on age in Mangold. However, it 
is unclear what he meant by this opinion, given the fact that it seems that 
this provision of the Charter does not differentiate between the level of le-
66 Case C-411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-8531, Opin-
ion of AG Mazák.
67 ibid, para 79.
68 In his Opinion in Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] 
ECR I-6467, paras 46-56), AG Geelhoed criticised the Court of Justice for having deduced 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age from the principle of equality. In ad-
dition, he noted the potentially far-reaching economic and financial consequences of claims 
to equal treatment based on the prohibitions set out in Article 13 of the EC Treaty. The 
interpretation of measures based on Article 13 of the EC Treaty must not be stretched by 
relying on the words ‘[w]ithin the limits of the powers conferred by [the Treaty] upon the 
Community’ in that article, and still less by relying on the general policy of equality. Such 
an approach would impinge upon decisions made by the Member States in the exercise of 
powers which they still retain. Accordingly, he advocated a more restrained interpretation 
than that adopted by the Court in Mangold.
69 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621.
70 ibid, para 95.
71 ibid, para 96.
72 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR 
I-0000, para 78 of the Opinion and the footnotes thereto.
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gal protection accorded to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
of age and that on grounds of sexual orientation. 
However, the Court of Justice does not seem to share these doubts. 
In fact, it follows from its ruling in Römer73 that the prohibition of dis-
crimination on grounds of sexual orientation in Article 21(1) of the Char-
ter is a general principle of law.
In Kofoed,74 Advocate General Kokott points out a danger for the le-
gal certainty of EU law. She stated that, in cases falling within the scope 
of Directive 90/434,75 a general principle of Community law prohibit-
ing the misuse of law has been given specific effect in Article 11(1)(a) of 
the directive and has been expressed in a concrete manner. She warned 
that if it were to be permitted, in addition, to have recourse to a general 
principle which in terms of content is much less clear and precise, there 
would be a danger, thus, that the harmonisation objective of Directive 
90/434 would be undermined and the legal certainty surrounding the re-
structuring of companies which it seeks to achieve would be jeopardised. 
Moreover, such an approach would undermine the prohibition, already 
mentioned, on directly applying untransposed provisions of directives to 
the detriment of individuals.
4.4.4 Evaluation of the critiques
The only weak point of the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach is that 
the Court of Justice did not manage to reconcile, on grounds of clear 
and persuasive arguments, the effects a directive may produce and the 
effects of the application of the general principle of non-discrimination.76 
However, Kücükdeveci can be considered as a partial clarification of Man-
gold since the Court of Justice explained that it is the general principle 
of law expressed in a directive and in a Charter provision which applies 
between private parties. One may argue that it is regrettable that back in 
Mangold the Court of Justice did not for the first time refer to the Charter, 
taking into account that Article 21(1) of the Charter explicitly provides, 
inter alia, that for measures which fall within the scope of Union law, 
any discrimination based on any ground such as age shall be prohibited. 
However, the Charter was at the time not a legally binding document but 
a mere declaration. Therefore, reference to it would not calm the many 
critiques of this judgment. 
73 Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I-0000 ac-
cessed 25 September 2014.
74 Case C-321/05 Hans Markus Kofoed v Kingdom of Danmark (Skatteministeriet) [2007] 
ECR I-05795.
75 Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation ap-
plicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning com-
panies of different Member States [1990] OJ L225, 1.
76 See Prechal (n 25) 19.
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Despite a great deal of criticism, the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) held that Mangold was not a case ultra vires 
with regard to the conferral of powers to the EU.77 Firstly, it considered 
that the situation of Mangold was regulated by legislation transposing 
Directive 2000/78. Secondly, it took the view that the Court of Justice 
did not fundamentally alter the division of competences in limiting the 
discretion of the German legislator before the date for the transposition 
of Directive 2000/78 had passed. Thirdly, it stressed that by ‘inventing’ a 
new general principle of law, the Court of Justice had not created a new 
competence of the European Union, since Directive 2000/78 which cre-
ates a general framework for combating age discrimination was passed 
by the Council, so that it was the Member States who had extended the 
competences of the Union in this area.78 
5. Limits of the application of the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach 
between private individuals
5.1 Right to paid annual leave (Article 31(2) of the Charter)
5.1.1 Dominguez and the silence of the Court of Justice
In Dominguez, the Court of Justice did not at all address the issue of 
whether the right to paid annual leave from Article 31(2) of the Charter 
applies in a proceeding between private parties,79 despite the fact that it 
was specifically asked by the referring court to do so. Since there was a 
normative conflict between a national provision of law and a directive, the 
national court asked the Court of Justice whether Article 7 of Directive 
2003/8880 must be interpreted as meaning that in proceedings between 
individuals a national provision which makes entitlement to paid annual 
leave conditional on a minimum period of actual work during the refer-
ence period, which is contrary to Article 7, must be disregarded.
In contrast, the issue of horizontal effect was extensively discussed 
by Advocate General Trstenjak81 who, among other things, emphasised 
the division of competences between the Union and Member States and 
stated that the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter clearly deter-
77 Decision of 6 July 2010 (2 BvR 2661/06).
78 See Malte Beyer-Katzenberger, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint at the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht: Was the Mangold Judgment of the European Court of Justice an Ultra 
Vires Act? (2011) 11 ERA Forum 517.
79 For the possible reasons why the Court of Justice did so, see De Mol (n 10). 
80 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299, 9.
81 Case C-282/10 Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 
Préfet de la région Centre [2012] ECR I-0000, Opinion of AG Trstenjak.
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mines the entities bound by fundamental rights and that to assess the 
function of the fundamental right in Article 31 of the Charter according 
to its regulatory purpose amounts to nothing more than the establish-
ment of a ‘duty of protection’ on the EU and the Member States. This 
view of the respective Advocate General can hardly be reconciled with 
the case law of the Court of Justice on the horizontal effect of the Treaty. 
Therefore, since the Charter does not recognise the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights, she concluded that private individuals are not di-
rectly bound by the fundamental right in question. It can be added that 
the mentioned provision is neutral as to the question of the horizontal 
effect of the Charter since it neither prohibits it nor implies it. She added, 
as a further argument against the horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
in general, that private individuals cannot satisfy the legislative proviso 
contained in Article 52(1) of the Charter according to which ‘[a]ny limita-
tion on the exercise of rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter 
must be provided for by law’, since the laws can only be passed by the 
Union or its Member States. Even if the right to paid annual leave was a 
general principle of law, the respective directive is, in the opinion of the 
Advocate General, not specific enough.
The Court of Justice observed that the entitlement of every worker to 
paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly important principle 
of European Union social law. It went on to consider that in the dispute in 
the main proceedings, the national court states that the first paragraph 
of Article L 223-2 of the French Labour Code (Code du travail), which 
makes entitlement to paid annual leave conditional on a minimum of one 
month’s actual work during the reference period, is not amenable to an 
interpretation that is compatible with Article 7 of Directive 2003/88.82
However, the Court of Justice did not rule out the possibility for the 
national court to determine, taking the whole body of domestic law into 
consideration, in particular Article L 223-4 of the Code du travail, and ap-
plying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view 
to ensuring that Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 is fully effective and to 
achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it, wheth-
er it can find an interpretation of that law that allows the absence of the 
worker due to an accident on a journey to or from work to be treated as 
being equivalent to one of the situations covered by that article of the 
Code du travail.83 
If such an interpretation is not possible, the Court of Justice ob-
served that it is necessary to consider whether Article 7(1) of Directive 
2003/88 has a direct effect and, if so, whether Ms Dominguez may rely 
82 See Dominguez (n 21) paras 16, 23-26.
83 ibid, para 31.
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on that direct effect against her employer, the CICOA,84 in view of its legal 
nature.85 In fact, the Court of Justice considers it possible that the public 
tasks entrusted to the CICOA might assimilate its position to that of the 
state, so that Article 7(1) of the Directive 2003/88 could accordingly be 
invoked against the CICOA. It entrusted this determination to the na-
tional court. If that provision fulfils the conditions required to produce 
a direct effect, the consequence would be that the national court would 
have to disregard any conflicting national provision. If that is not the 
case, the Court of Justice, referring to Pfeiffer and Others, observed that 
even a clear, precise and unconditional provision of a directive seeking to 
confer rights or impose obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in 
proceedings exclusively between private parties.86 
In such a situation, the party injured as a result of domestic law not 
being in conformity with EU law can nonetheless ask, if appropriate, for 
compensation for the loss sustained.87
5.1.2 Heimann88 
In this case, the Court of Justice did not find a normative conflict 
between the respective national provision and the right to paid annual 
leave. At the very outset, the Court of Justice noted that the entitlement 
of every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded as a particularly 
important principle of EU social law.89 It is, as a principle of EU social 
law, expressly laid down in Article 31(2) of the Charter, which Article 
6(1) TEU recognises as having the same legal value as the Treaties.90 It is 
to be noted that the right to annual leave can, according to Article 52(5) 
of the Charter, be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by 
institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member 
States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their 
respective powers. Additionally, principles shall be cognisable only in the 
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling of their legality. In other 
words, provisions of the Charter which contain principles do not have 
horizontal effect in proceedings between individuals.
84 The Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, a body operating in the field of 
social security.
85 Dominguez (n 21) para 32.
86 ibid, para 33.
87 ibid, para 43, referring to Francovich and Others (n 22).
88 Joined cases C-229/11 and C-230/11 Alexander Heimann (C-229/11) and Konstantin 
Toltschin (C-230/11) v Kaiser GmbH [2012] ECR I-0000.
89 Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (C-350/06) and Stringer and 
Others v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (C-520/06) [2009] ECR I-179, para 54; and 
Case C-337/10 Georg Neidel v Stadt Frankfurt am Main [2012] ECR I-0000, para 28.
90 Case C-214/10 KHS AG v Winfried Schulte [2011] ECR I-0000, para 37; and Neidel (n 89) 
para 40.
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However, the Court of Justice pointed out that a worker’s right to 
minimum paid annual leave, guaranteed by EU law, applicable in a situ-
ation where the worker could not fulfil his obligation to work during the 
reference period due to an illness, cannot be applied mutatis mutandis 
to the situation of a worker on short-time work, such as that in this 
case. Therefore, Article 31(2) of the Charter and Article 7(1) of Directive 
2003/8891 must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude 
national legislation or practice, such as a social plan agreed between an 
undertaking and its works council, under which the paid annual leave 
of a worker on short-time work is calculated according to the rule of pro 
rata temporis.
5.2 Association de médiation sociale: Provision of the Charter which 
is ‘not sufficient in itself to confer individual rights on individuals’
In this case, the trade union ‘Union départementale CGT des Bouch-
es-du-Rhône’ appointed Mr Laboubi as representative of the trade union 
section created within the AMS. The AMS is an association governed by 
private law, even if it has a social objective. It challenged that appoint-
ment and claimed that it had staff numbers of fewer than 11 and, a for-
tiori, fewer than 50 employees and that, as a result, it was not required, 
under the relevant national legislation, to take measures for the repre-
sentation of employees, such as the election of a staff representative. 
Additionally, AMS considered that it was necessary to exclude from the 
calculation of its staff numbers, in accordance with Article L 1111-3 of 
the Labour Code, apprentices, employees with an employment-initiative 
contract or an accompanied-employment contract, and employees with a 
professional training contract (‘employees with assisted contracts’). It is 
to be noted that because of the legal nature of the AMS, the trade union 
cannot rely on the provisions of Directive 2002/14, as such, against that 
association. One of the questions before the Court of Justice was, there-
fore, whether Article 27 of the Charter applies between private parties. 
5.2.1 Opinion of the Advocate General
While the Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Association de médiation 
sociale proposed that the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach should be ex-
tended to the right of workers to information and consultation ‘within the 
undertaking’ referred to in Article 27 of the Charter, the Court of Justice 
did not follow this opinion. The Advocate General based his proposal on 
the following arguments. Since the horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
is not unknown to EU law, it would be paradoxical if the incorporation of 
the Charter into primary law actually changed that state of affairs for the 
91 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
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worse.92 He opined that Article 27 may be relied on in a dispute between 
individuals. In other words, that possibility cannot be denied on the basis 
of the argument that the Charter, as a consequence of the provisions of 
Article 51(1), has no relevance in relations governed by private law93 and 
added that the right of workers to information and consultation within 
the undertaking, as guaranteed in Article 27 of the Charter, should be 
understood as a ‘principle’ for the purposes of Articles 51(1) and 52(5), 
and concluded, on the basis of the second sentence of Article 52(5) of the 
Charter, that Article 27 of the Charter, given specific substantive and di-
rect expression in Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14,94 may be relied on in 
a dispute between individuals, with the potential consequences that this 
may have concerning the non-application of the national legislation.95 
Consequently, Advocate General Cruz Villalón proposed to the Court of 
Justice to interpret Article 27 of the Charter, given specific substantive 
and direct expression in Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14, as meaning 
that it precludes national legislation which excludes a specific category 
of workers, namely those with ‘excluded contracts’, from the calculation 
of staff numbers for the purposes of that provision.96
5.2.2 Judgment of the Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice did not follow Advocate General Cruz Villalón’s 
opinion. Right at the outset, it emphasised that the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in 
all situations governed by EU law.97 Thus, since the national legislation 
at issue was adopted to implement Directive 2002/14, Article 27 of the 
Charter is applicable to the case in question.98 It went on to observe that 
Article 27 of the Charter, titled ‘Workers’ right to information and con-
sultation within the undertaking’, provides that workers must, at vari-
ous levels, be guaranteed information and consultation in the cases and 
under the conditions provided for by EU law and national laws and prac-
tices. For this article to be fully effective, it must be given more specific 
expression in EU or national law.99 It concluded that it is not possible to 
infer from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter or from the explanatory 
notes to that Article that Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/14, as a directly 
92 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 2) para 35.
93 ibid, para 41.
94 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European 
Community [2002] OJ L80, 29.
95 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 2), para 80.
96 ibid, para 97.
97 See Åkerberg Fransson (n 27) para 19.
98 See Association de médiation sociale (n 21) paras 42, 43.
99 ibid, paras 44, 45.
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applicable rule of law, lays down and addresses to the Member States 
a prohibition on excluding from the calculation of the staff numbers in 
an undertaking a specific category of employees initially included in the 
group of persons to be taken into account in that calculation.100 The im-
portant issue the Court of Justice addressed was whether the Mangold/
Kücükdeveci approach was transposable to Article 27 of the Charter. The 
answer of the Court of Justice in this respect was negative. While in 
its judgment the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, laid 
down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on in-
dividuals an individual right which they may invoke as such, the wording 
of Article 27 of the Charter is not.101 The Court of Justice added that this 
finding cannot be called into question by considering Article 27 of the 
Charter in conjunction with the provisions of Directive 2002/14.102 
Accordingly, in the same way as in Dominguez, a party injured as a 
result of domestic law not being in conformity with European Union law 
can nonetheless go through a national court in order to obtain, if appro-
priate, compensation for the loss sustained.103
It follows from the foregoing that Article 27 of the Charter, by itself 
or in conjunction with the provisions of Directive 2002/14, must be in-
terpreted to the effect that, where a national provision implementing that 
directive, such as Article L 1111-3 of the Labour Code, is incompatible 
with EU law, that article of the Charter cannot be invoked in a dispute 
between individuals in order to disapply that national provision.104
6. Conclusions
The concept of horizontal effect of the Charter, in light of the existing 
case law on this subject, is not an unlimited one.
Firstly, it follows from its existing case law that the Court of Justice 
is not willing to transpose the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach to provi-
sions other than those which are a specific expression of the principle of 
equality in the chapter on ‘Equality’ of the Charter. Dominguez does not 
shed light on this approach, although Article 31(2) of the Charter states, 
in unequivocal terms, like Article 21(1) on the prohibition of discrimina-
tion, that ‘[e]very worker has the right to […] an annual period of paid 
leave’ which amounts to a kind of minimum protection which must be 
accorded to every worker in the EU. However, the right to paid annual 
100 ibid, paras 46.
101 ibid, para 47.
102 ibid, para 49.
103 ibid, para 50.
104 ibid, para 51.
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leave is, as the Court of Justice pointed out in Heimann, a ‘particular im-
portant principle of European Social Law’ and not a general principle of 
law. In contrast, the prohibition of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
in Mangold/Kücükdeveci is a specific application of the principle of equal-
ity which is a general principle of law applicable between private parties. 
Similarly, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex and nation-
ality is also a general principle of law, therefore granting  horizontal effect 
to Articles 21(2) and 23 of the Charter.
Secondly, Association de médiation sociale is the first case which 
gives minimum criteria for distinguishing the provisions of the Charter 
which have horizontal effect from those which do not have such effect. 
The distinguishing criteria which can be deduced from that case are 
whether or not a provision of the Charter is ‘sufficient in itself to con-
fer individual rights on individuals’. Oddly enough, the Court of Justice 
does not mention that a certain provision must at the same time be an 
expression of a general principle of law, putting into question the central 
feature of the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach. The Court of Justice does 
not explain what the content of ‘sufficient in itself’ is, leaving to itself a 
margin of discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis which provision of 
the Charter has horizontal effect and which does not. The concept partly 
resembles the vertical effect of a directive according to which a provision 
must be clear, unconditional and sufficiently precise in order to produce 
such an effect. However, in the light of the criteria arising from Associa-
tion de médiation sociale, one may deduce from the clear and unequivo-
cal wording of Article 31(2) that, in so far as this provision does not refer 
to the further implementing measures adopted by the EU or its Member 
States, it has horizontal effect. In contrast, a provision like Article 27 
of the Charter which provides that workers must, at various levels, be 
guaranteed information and consultation in the cases and ‘under the 
conditions provided for by European Union law and national laws and 
practices’ is conditional upon the adoption of further measures. Several 
articles of the Charter include more general formulations excluding their 
direct effect, such as: ‘under the conditions established by national laws 
and practices’ (Articles 28, 30 and 35) or ‘in accordance with the rules 
laid down in Union law and national laws and practices’ (Article 34). Even 
if it is not expressly stated in Article 31(2), the right to paid annual leave 
is also conditional upon further implementing measures since at least its 
length and the authority for its approval must be determined in advance 
so that this right can be applied in practice. It is somehow difficult to un-
derstand that if the provision of the Charter is conditional upon the adop-
tion of further implementing measures, it is not relevant for the assess-
ment of its eventual horizontal effect if these measures really exist or not. 
One of the examples is Directive 2002/14 and the national legislations 
transposing it which implement Article 27 of the Charter. Nevertheless, 
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the Court of Justice ruled that this circumstance is immaterial for the 
evaluation of an eventual horizontal effect of that provision. However, it 
results from the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach, Defrenne II and Angon-
ese that in this case law the Court of Justice held that it was immaterial 
that a provision of primary law of the EU was formally addressed to the 
Member States, preferring instead to recognise horizontal effect on the 
ground that a provision at issue was mandatory in nature. In the same 
sense, fundamental rights are also mandatory in nature since they can-
not be limited by means of a private contract, but ‘by law’, as Article 52(2) 
of the Charter provides.
Thirdly, the concept of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
comes from its social function which is, as Seifert argues, the preven-
tion of asymmetries in private contractual relationships, a tool which 
perfectly fits into the socio-economic rights contained in the chapter on 
‘Solidarity’ of the Charter. Taking into account its function, as well as the 
fact that the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach has been developed within 
the employment law acquis, it is odd that Article 52(5) of the Charter 
which seeks to distinguish the provisions of the Charter containing ‘prin-
ciples’, ie socio-economic rights, was adopted with a view to rendering 
these rights largely non-justiciable. It is well known that several Member 
States feared that the recognition of particular economic and social rights 
in the Charter would result in the judicialisation of public policy, particu-
larly in areas of significant budgetary importance. In fact, what would ul-
timately be called ‘principles’ were described in the initial drafts as ‘social 
principles’. Although the adjective would later be removed, it is clear that 
the main concern of the authors of the Charter concerned rights to social 
benefits and social and employment rights.105 However, the application of 
the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach also implies financial concerns for 
the private actors, and the Court of Justice did not rule in Mangold that 
the authors of Article 13 of the EC Treaty did not presuppose direct ef-
fect for this provision, but rather gave priority to the action on the part of 
Member States. Therefore, budgetary implications for the Member States 
will not be the central issue preventing the eventual recognition of the 
horizontal effect of the ‘Solidarity’ rights in the Charter.
Fourthly, it follows from the Mangold/Kücükdeveci approach that 
the prevailing rationale of the Court of Justice for horizontal effect is the 
full effectiveness of EU law, although its meaning is difficult to discern. 
Notwithstanding that the Court of Justice has never explained what is 
meant by this legal concept and that this notion is to be deduced from 
other sources of EU law, such as the Opinions of Advocates General, it 
is not clear why the Court of Justice does not apply the same concept in 
105 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón (n 2).
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Dominguez and Association de médiation sociale. As mentioned above, 
the right of the party injured to seek compensation of damages is not a 
legal remedy that acts as a sufficient deterrent for a Member State which 
violates EU law. Additionally, whether such an action is founded or not is 
decided by the courts of Member States. Likewise, the party injured may 
be reluctant to sue its own Member State also for other reasons, such 
as the high fees of court proceedings, their length, the number of legal 
conditions which have to be fulfilled for the success of such an action, 
and, finally, the unpredictability of the outcome of the proceeding. These 
deterrents, as well as the fact that the correct implementation of a direc-
tive lies in the hands of a national legislator (politics), and not with the 
court (law), water down considerably the protection that the chapter on 
‘Solidarity’ of the Charter aims to guarantee. 
Fifthly and lastly, paradoxically, the prevailing objective of the chap-
ter ‘Solidarity’ of the Charter should be the reinforcement of the protec-
tion of the ‘weaker’ party and not the contrary. After all, by introducing 
more fairness into relationships between private parties, the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights pursues the objectives of social justice. The 
shift of the case law of the Court of Justice towards this objective would 
constitute an important move towards the social character of the EU, 
taking into account, as the Preamble to the Charter and Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union stipulate, that the Union is founded on uni-
versal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. The rec-
ognition of the horizontal effect of the Charter’s socio-economic rights 
would contribute to these values on which the Union is founded.
The answer to the question that this article poses is, unfortunately, 
not positive in its entirety, since the full effectiveness of EU law, as far as 
the horizontal effect of numerous fundamental rights and, in particular, 
socio-economic rights are concerned, is still a goal to be achieved.
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